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Some children with high-functioning autistic spectrum conditions (ASC) have been noted clinically to 
produce accounts and responses akin to confabulations in neurological patients. Neurological 
confabulation is typically associated with abnormalities of the frontal lobes and related structures, 
and some forms have been linked to poor performance on source monitoring and executive function 
tasks.  ASC has also been linked to atypical development of the frontal lobes, and impaired 
performance on source monitoring and executive tasks. But confabulation in autism has not to our 
knowledge previously been examined experimentally. So we investigated whether patterns of 
confabulation in autism might share similarities with neurologically-based confabulation. Tests of 
confabulation elicitation, source monitoring (reality monitoring, plus temporal and task context 
memory) and executive function were administered to four adolescents with ASC who had 
previously been noted to confabulate spontaneously in everyday life. Scores were compared to a 
typically developing (TD) and an ASC control group. One confabulating participant was significantly 
impaired at reality monitoring, and one was significantly worse at a task context test, relative to 
both the ASC and TD controls. Three of the confabulators showed impairment on measures of 
executive function (Brixton test; Cognitive Estimates test; Hayling Test B errors) relative to both 
control groups. Three were significantly poorer than the TD controls on two others (Hayling A and B 
times), but the ASC control group was also significantly slower at this test than the TD controls. 
Compared to TD controls, two of the four confabulating participants produced an abnormal number 
of confabulations during a confabulation elicitation questionnaire, where the ASC controls and TD 
controls did not differ from each other. These results raise the possibility that in at least some cases, 
confabulation in autism may be less related to social factors than it is to impaired source memory or 
poor executive function.  
 






Over the last 30 years, the cognitive impairments underlying autism have been increasingly 
investigated and a number of prominent theories have been suggested, the best known of which is 
the frequent presence of a mentalizing impairment (Frith, 2003).  These cognitive impairments 
attempt to explain the core behavioural symptoms of the disorder.  However, there are also a 
number of behavioural features that are not considered to be core to the autism spectrum. These 
occur with some consistency, but only in a minority of individuals with the diagnosis.  One such 
feature is confabulation, which is defined as the tendency to relate experiences that have not 
occurred, as if they had.  Interestingly, some of the first clinical accounts of people with autism noted 
the occurrence of confabulation. For instance, Hans Asperger described confabulatory behaviour in 
one of the four children he originally studied: 
 
He was said to be an inveterate 'liar'. He did not lie in order to get out of something 
that he had done - this was certainly not his problem, as he always told the truth very 
brazenly - but he told long, fantastic stories, his confabulations becoming ever more 
strange and incoherent. He liked to tell fantastic stories, in which he always appeared 
as the hero. He would tell his mother how he was praised by the teacher in front of the 
class, and other similar tales. (Asperger [1944] translated in Frith, 1991, p.51.) 
 
The tendency for some people with autism to construct such confabulations is recognised within the 
widely-used assessment tool the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS-G, Lord et al, 2000) 
which asks raters to code whether the interviewee “describes an event that seems unlikely to have 
been real”.  Despite this, no research to date has been conducted into confabulatory behaviour in 
autism. So in this novel research study, we extended a recent trend for applying methods from the 
field of adult cognitive neuroscience to examine developmental confabulation in children with 
autism, in particular focusing on source monitoring and executive function.   
 
The nature of confabulation 
Confabulation has been defined as “a falsification of memory occurring in clear consciousness” 
(Berlyne, 1972). People who confabulate are typically agnosognosic: they are unaware of any 
memory deficit, or at least grossly underestimate its severity (McGlynn and Schachter, 1989). They 
have no intent to deceive the listener; as such, confabulation has been described by Moscovitch 
(1989) as “honest lying”. Burgess and Shallice (1996b), describe the principal features of 
confabulation as follows: 
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a. Confabulations are typically (but not necessarily) coherent accounts that concern the person 
describing them, most apparent when autobiographical recollection is required. 
 
b. The account is false within its context, and may also be false in detail. 
 
c. The content is most often drawn from the patient’s own experiences, including thoughts that they 
have had. However some aspects may be derived from semantic memory. 
 
d. Confabulations are a product of impaired memory processes, not a result of conscious 
compensatory procedures. 
 
e. People often act on the basis of their confabulations. 
 
f. Confabulators are unaware that they are confabulating.  
 
But although these characteristics are common to all confabulations (at least, those identified so far), 
there are still a very wide variety of different forms, and discussions about them have a substantial 
history (e.g. Berlyne, 1972; Damasio et al, 1985; Schnider et al, 1996a Kopelman, 1987, 1999; Burgess 
and McNeil, 1999; Moulin, 2013; Schnider et al, 2013). In general, it is assumed that at least some 
confabulatory phenomena relate to unusual behaviours seen in experimental tasks that tap 
“executive” or “metacognitive” aspects of memory. Examples are intrusion errors or false positives in 
recall of word lists; being willing to answer direct questions to which one cannot possibly know the 
answer; overconfidence in judging their memory performance, and reality monitoring deficits (e.g. 
Moulin, 2013; Stolzenberg and Pezdek, 2013; Nahum et al, 2012 . There is plenty of evidence that 
confabulators tend to do (although do not invariantly do) poorly on a range of memory tests. Many 
also perform poorly on tests of executive abilities associated with frontal lobe function. However, the 
precise relation between different forms of confabulation and performance on experimental or 
clinical tests is far from clear (e.g. Nahum et al, 2012; Shingakia et al, 2016). It is probably fairest to 
summarise our current level of understanding by saying that while most confabulators show some 
kind of disturbance on clinical and lab-based memory tests, and/or also often also on tests of 
executive function, it is not possible to predict well from knowing the test scores what form of 
confabulation will be displayed, nor perhaps even if confabulation will be shown. Nevertheless, 
although there is a distinct lack of specificity at present in our understanding of the relation between 
test performance and symptom, the consistent presence of at least some sort of decrement on tasks 
relating to memory control, metacognitive and executive functions, albeit unpredictable, means that 
it is common in experimental investigations of confabulation in neurological patients to include such 
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measures. Accordingly, we do so here. In particular, we consider explanations that relate to three of 
the principal putative explanations of confabulation. It is important to note that these accounts are 
not competitors, nor are they exclusive. Rather, they seek to explain different aspects of the highly 
varied presentations seen in confabulation, and more than one can be relevant in any one case. 
 
The first, and one of the oldest, accounts is the dysexecutive hypothesis of confabulation, which holds 
that that deficits in executive function are a predisposing feature of confabulation (Berlyne, 1972; 
Stuss et al, 1978; Baddeley and Wilson, 1988). Confabulation is thus viewed as one symptom of the 
broader set of dysexecutive symptoms (see Burgess, 1998 for overview), and is associated with a 
wide variety of pathologies, but especially those that affect the frontal lobes (e.g. Turner, Cipolotti, 
Yousry and Shallice, 2008b). Indeed, Gilboa and Moscovitch (2002), reviewing thirty nine studies, 
found that 81% of confabulators had damage to prefrontal cortex, most commonly the orbitofrontal 
and ventromedial aspects of the frontal lobe. According to the dysexecutive hypothesis, a variety of 
deficits could cause confabulation, e.g. failure to inhibit incorrect responses, inability to monitor 
behaviour, misuse of environmental cues, a tendency to impulsivity, and lack of concern about 
correct performance (Stuss et al, 1978; Shapiro et al, 1981). However, since the correlation between 
confabulation and other dysexecutive symptoms is modest (e.g. Burgess et al 1998 found 
correlations of between .30 to .54 in a group of 92 patients), and not universally found (see e.g. 
Schnider and colleagues, 1996b; 2000; Dalla Barba et al, 1990), it is possible that only a small 
proportion of people who confabulate do so because of executive-type difficulties. It is also possible 
that there are executive processes that are quite specific to certain forms of memory retrieval, and 
so they are manifesting only in the domain of confabulation (see Cunningham et al, 1997). Indeed, 
these memory-specific control processes may be the same as those highlighted by the other two 
accounts described below, thus highlighting the relations between them. The principal difference in 
this account is perhaps therefore the idea that contributory factors to the presentation can be 
measured by tasks that do not prima facie have a strong memory load, but instead measure aspects 
of thinking such as inhibition, concept formation, reasoning and so forth.  Accordingly, we measure 
these aspects here.  
 
Confabulation has also been looked at from the point of view of reality monitoring. Reality 
monitoring is the ability to distinguish between actual/perceived and imagined events (Johnson, 
O’Connor and Cantor, 1997; Johnson and Raye, 1998), and is a subform of the broader category of 
source memory (which is knowing where or from whom some information came from rather than 
what the information was). According to this accounts, confabulation is explained in relation to 
mistaking imagined events for real ones. For example, Johnson et al (1997) studied a patient who 
reported that items were presented as words when she had imagined them as pictures; Ward and 
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Parkin (2000), reported a patient who tended to say he had performed actions he had only imagined; 
see also Turner et al (2008a). In healthy subjects, real and imagined events can be distinguished by 
the different sources attributed to each (real events will have, for example, a perceptual base to act 
as their source, which imagined events will lack); perhaps this ability is deficient in confabulation. 
This account is appealingly straightforward, but as with all other accounts of confabulation, is 
unlikely to explain every presentation. For instance, Johnson et al (1997) reported a confabulating 
frontal patient who did not perform any more poorly at source monitoring than non-confabulating 
frontal controls, but performed more poorly in other tasks. They concluded that the confabulation 
was not due to impaired source monitoring alone, but in conjunction with a vivid imagination and an 
inability to retrieve autobiographical memories systematically. Another limitation is that since this 
theory concentrates on memory retrieval, it does not explain why particularly bizarre confabulations 
can be produced in some cases (Dab et al, 1999; Dalla Barba, 1993). Another further difficulty is the 
prediction that imagined events will be mistaken for real ones; Dalla Barba et al (1997) found in one 
case that real events were just as likely to be mistaken for imagined ones. Nevertheless, this account 
is highly appealing in explaining certain forms of confabulation, and has considerable experimental 
support. So, here we also look at how well experimental tasks measuring this ability might relate to 
confabulation in our autism participants. 
 
A third prominent account for confabulation is the “temporal context hypothesis”. Temporal 
context is the ability to recall the correct order of events, and their temporal relations to each other. 
It is often viewed as a particular type of source memory (e.g. Turner et al, 2008c). This account 
follows from the observation that the content of confabulations seem to be temporally-loose 
combinations of real memories, which can often be traced to events in the patient’s past. It has 
therefore been proposed that confabulation stems from an inability to recognise the temporal 
context of memories (Schnider et al, 1996b; Schnider, 2003; and Dalla Barba and La Corte, 2015, for 
a related account).  The likelihood that this explanation can explain all forms of confabulation is 
probably not greater than for the dysexecutive or reality monitoring accounts. There is certainly 
evidence in favour: for instance, Schnider and Ptak (1999) asked participants to observe stimuli and 
then, following a break of thirty minutes, they were asked to identify recurrences of stimuli within 
that session but to forget that they had seen them half an hour previously. Spontaneous 
confabulators (i.e. those who produce confabulations in everyday life, without necessarily being 
asked a direct question) identified images they had seen thirty minutes previously as having been 
seen only moments before, thus supporting the hypothesis. Also concordant with this explanation 
are observations that confabulators can perform poorly at discriminating when stimuli were 
presented (Schnider et al, 1996a; Johnson et al, 1997). However it has also been noted that non-
confabulators (e.g. amnesics and those with dorsofrontal lesions with no associated memory 
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problems) can also fail such tasks (e.g. Shimamura et al, 1990; Johnson et al, 1997), and it is hard to 
account for the bizarre or fixed content of some confabulations through this explanation.  A variant 
of the temporal context hypothesis is based upon patients who confabulate not only to questions 
relating to the past but also to those relating to the present and future (Dalla Barba et al, 1997). 
According to this explanation, confabulation stems from impaired awareness of the flow of time in 
memory (“personal temporality”); this may explain why confabulations often occur in the episodic 
rather than semantic domain (Dalla Barba et al, 1997). Some confabulators, at least, seem to 
confuse ongoing reality with the past, so we measure this tendency here also. 
 
So far, we have considered confabulation from the point of view of neurological patients, who 
frequently show disturbances of memory. But is there evidence for memory alterations in autism? 
There is indeed some evidence of altered memory function in autism from experimental studies. 
Individuals with autism tend to perform better than controls in rote-memory tasks in which 
attention to detail is advantageous, such as the ability to remember random word-lists, but show 
weaknesses when remembering information in context, such as memory of meaningful sentences 
(Hermelin and O’Connor, 1967).  They also tend to show an enhanced ability to recognise false 
memories possibly due to a lack of reliance on context, for example when presented with related 
words (e.g. sharp, pin, sewing) they are better able to recognise similar words not previously 
presented as novel words (e.g. needle; Beversdorf et al, 2000 but see Bowler et al., 2000 for a lack of 
replication).  Children with autism spectrum conditions (ASC) have been shown to have reduced 
autobiographical memory (Bruck, London, Landa and Goodman, 2007); proposed explanations 
include delayed self-recognition impairing their ability to form autobiographical memories (e.g. 
Howe and Courage, 1997), or delayed social and language development (Nelson and Fivush, 2004).  
However, children with autism are more likely to make errors of omission than errors of commission 
(i.e. insertion of events or details) compared to controls (Bruck et al., 2007). In agreement with 
notions of changes in use of context in autism, autistic children have been shown to be impaired at 
source monitoring. In a paradigm involving discrimination between cards placed by the subject and 
cards placed by the experimenter, autistic children made more errors than controls (Russell and 
Jarrold, 1999). Similarly, Hala, Rasmussen and Henderson (2005) found that autistic children 
performed more poorly than controls at three types of source monitoring: internal, external and 
reality monitoring (although see Farrant, Blades and Boucher, 1998 for a lack of replication on a 
reality-monitoring task). 
 
Similarly, it is well-documented that autistic individuals display perturbations in performance 
on the same tests of executive function that can be performed poorly by frontal-lobe damaged 
patients (see e.g. Frith, 2003; Towgood, Meuwese, Gilbert, Turner and Burgess, 2009; White, 
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Burgess and Hill, 2009). Functional imaging studies have also reported atypical frontal activity in 
people with a diagnosis of autism when performing executive tasks (e.g. Luna et al, 2002; Gilbert, 
Bird, Brindley, Frith and Burgess, 2008), and abnormal structure and function of some areas of PFC 
are often quoted as a potential source of the clinical presentation (e.g. Castelli, Frith, Happé, and 
Frith, 2002).   
On these grounds it might be proposed that there may be some similarities between 
confabulation of acquired neurological origin, and confabulation of developmental origin. 
Accordingly in the current study, we identified a small number of high-functioning autistic children 
who presented clinically with unusual verbal accounts and responses which, if they were in 
neurological patients, would have been classified as confabulation. We investigated whether these 
developmental confabulations might share characteristics with neurological confabulations by 
administering tests of source monitoring and executive function that have elicited poor 
performance in neurological confabulators, as well as attempting to elicit confabulations.  The 
participants identified as producing confabulations were treated as case studies, and were 
compared with two control groups: those with and without autism, allowing us to differentiate 
between impairments general to autism and those specific to individuals with autism who 
confabulate. This is the first time, to our knowledge, that confabulation in autism has been studied 





Ethics approval for the study was received from the Joint UCL/UCLH Committee on the Ethics 
of Human Research and from the Great Ormond Street Hospital (GOSH) Research Ethics Committee 
and written consent was obtained from the parents of all participants, or the participants 
themselves where appropriate, prior to inclusion in the study.  Four high-functioning adolescents 
with a clinical diagnosis on the autism spectrum and a history of confabulation were recruited to 
take part in the study.  Three of them were recruited from GOSH, which offers a specialist national 
service which is designed for the assessment of complex cases and the provision of second opinions 
when there is uncertainty at local level as to whether a child has ASD. The service is specifically for 
the assessment of high-functioning ASD, and so only reflects referrals from children with fluent 
language, and with current or recent engagement with mainstream education. Participants were 
identified via discussion with the clinical team, who were asked to identify recent clients who met 
criteria for ASD and showed confabulation. One further confabulating participant was found when 
their parents contacted one of the research team (PWB) directly after an internet search of 
confabulation researchers. We also tested two control groups who had no known history of 
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confabulation: those with and without ASC, hereon referred to as ASC controls (n=17) and TD 
controls (n=18).  The ASC controls were recruited from participant volunteer databases at UCL and 
Great Ormond Street Hospital (GOSH). The UCL ones were recruited from mainstream schools 
(including those with specialist autism units) in the Surrey or Sutton area of the UK, who had a 
diagnosis of an ASD.  They were self-selecting in that every child with a diagnosis at every school was 
contacted, and the ones we tested were those who were willing to participate. The TD controls were 
children of friends and neighbours of the first author, and for whom the parents had confirmed that 
there had never been any concern their children had an autism spectrum, or other developmental, 
condition. All participants were between the ages of 10 and 17 years and the two control groups 
were comparable for age (t(33) = 1.66, p = .107) and gender (X2(1)=.957, p=.328). Intellectual 
performance was not measured for the TD controls but is likely to be comparable: while the ASC 
controls’ IQs were non-significantly lower than average (VIQ: t(13)=1.66, p=.122; PIQ: t(13)=1.92, 
p=.077), the TD controls were also non-significantly younger, hence the groups were likely of 
comparable cognitive ability.  All 4 confabulating participants were comparable to the ASC controls 
(within 2 SDs of this group’s mean) in terms of age, IQ and symptomatology (see Table 1). 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Participants identified as producing confabulations. 
Participant 1 (P1).  P1 was 14 when he took part in this project.  He was diagnosed with 
autism at the age of 3 years and had a history of language delay.  The majority of his education had 
been in mainstream environments with support, most likely due to his average intelligence (VIQ 96, 
PIQ 88; measured at 10 years with WISC-III-UK, Wechsler, 1992).  At age 11, a parental interview 
(3DI; Skuse et al., 2004) provided evidence of significant difficulties in all three areas of the autistic 
triad (see Table 1). Aged 13, he scored above the clinical threshold on the ADOS-G (Lord et al., 2000. 
During test sessions at age 10, P1 gave incorrect answers seemingly on purpose and pretended 
to fall off his chair to avoid completing a task.  His speech contained unusual phrases, such as “I’ve 
only got less than a minute to diffuse any bomb” when he was running out of time on a task, and 
delayed echolalia mostly referring to films and cartoon characters.  During the ADOS at age 13, P1 
was noted to be overconfident, overfamiliar and to make various bizarre statements.  For example, 
when asked how he feels inside when he’s very happy, he replied "like I'm living the American 
dream, in heaven, no health and safety restrictions, no embarrassing video cameras on me", and 
later “I'm afraid of the paparazzi because they want to take photos of you at every angle”, both 
spoken in a casual tone and scattered amongst otherwise fairly typical conversation.  During this 
assessment, it also became noticeable that P1 had a tendency to make statements that were 
assumed to be confabulatory. Examples are given below. 
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Example 1.  "I've got a crazy Dad who keeps saying I eat too many Christmas crackers"  
[S.W. responds in surprise]  
"Sometimes I do.  He says, er, he keeps on trying to chuck roman candles into my neighbour's 
front, er, back garden coz I still remember a couple of years earlier when, um, in 2004 we had this 
huge party and we knocked their roman candle and there's like flares chasing us round the garden 
and I just ran inside and a second later there's a firework in the house and I'm just like “no, no”, and I 
just like ran upstairs"  
[P1 laughs.  S.W. asks if it was his Dad who set the firework off.]  
"Yeah, um, and what happened was, is that ten seconds later we launched the firework and 
the fuse blew it up and everyone was coated in soil."   
[P1 laughs again] 
Example 2.  When talking about his favourite day whilst on holiday:  
“When we went to that five star hotel I found a white piano and I'm like a grade 4 pianist right 
now, so I just started playing and the second I start playing I see thirty police officers coming in and I 
feel like I'm going to get arrested or play a wrong note.”  
[P1 laughs.  S.W. asks what the police officers were doing] 
“They were just like having a lunch break, and I never realised, and of course I counted them 
all up and there were like thirty, forty, fifty, more than I thought!  And I decided what on earth is 
going on, I don't know what's going to happen.” 
Example 3.  When talking about a girlfriend:  
"I asked her out and she fainted literally." 
[S.W. responds “really?”] 
"Yeah and I had to resuscitate her." 
 
Participant 2 (P2).  P2 was 11 when she took part in this project.  She was diagnosed with 
autism at the age of 6 years, labelled as ‘high-functioning’ and educated in mainstream settings. At 
age 10, she obtained a standardised score of 73 on the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices, 
placing her in the Borderline range of intelligence.  Physically, she was noted to be over-developed 
in terms of both height and head circumference (more than 2 and 3SDs respectively above the mean 
for her age and gender) and was reported to have entered puberty early.  Unfortunately, no 
measures of autism symptom severity were obtained. 
P2 first came to our attention at age 10 when her family reported that she frequently related 
events that had not occurred, resulting in serious consequences on more than one occasion.  For 
instance, she had recounted a detailed story involving inappropriate contact between her and 
another person while in a car. But when the reported events were investigated, it was proved that 
they could never have happened.  Her mother and older brother were interviewed informally, both 
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together and separately.  Both reported similar patterns of confabulation, which was apparently 
motiveless.  It was unclear whether P2 believed her own false accounts, but her family had the 
impression that she did, given that these had often led to negative consequences for herself, and 
they did not regard them as attention-seeking. 
 
Participant 3 (P3).  P3 was 17 when she took part in this project.  She was given a diagnosis of 
Asperger’s syndrome with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) at the age of 7 years.  Her 
education took place within mainstream settings due to her average to high-average intelligence 
(VIQ 99, PIQ 117; measured at 8 years with WISC-III-UK, Wechsler, 1992).  At age 8, a parental 
interview (3DI; Skuse et al., 2004) provided evidence of significant difficulties in the first two areas of 
the autistic triad (see Table 1). 
In conversation, P3 came across as being older than she was, accompanied by an insistence 
that she was much older than she really was.  This had begun around the age of 6 and, when seen at 
8 years of age, she claimed to be 18 years old.  At school she would tell teachers that she was in the 
classroom as an agent of the headmaster and, during test sessions, she claimed she went to school 
because she was at teacher training college and was gaining experience.  At this age, she also claimed 
to have had three children by a man who worked at a local restaurant, would play at breastfeeding 
her babies, and would talk about how painful childbirth was. She had changed the date of birth on 
documents to make herself ten years older. 
During assessment at age 8, P1 was attentive and cooperative although somewhat precocious.  
She engaged in adult-like conversation and would compliment the work of adults as if she was a 
peer, not a child.  She had a considerable range of gestures and non-verbal communication, although 
these were somewhat odd and staged.  She once described the other children at school as “my small 
buddies” whilst signing quotation marks in the air with her fingers.  Her parents interpreted her 
obsession with being an adult as an autistic focused-interest/preoccupation. 
 
Participant 4 (P4).  P4 was 11 when she took part in this project and had only just received a 
diagnosis of ASC, including a history of language delay.  There was a family history of developmental 
delay and obsessive compulsive disorder and P4 herself had a history of behavioural difficulties, 
memory problems and concentration difficulties.  Her education had taken place in mainstream 
settings although her intelligence test scores placed her in the average to low-average range and she 
was reported to struggle at school (Verbal Comprehension=77; Perceptual Reasoning=98; Working 
Memory=80; Processing Speed=70; WISC-IV (Wechsler, 2004).  At age 11, a parental interview (3DI; 
Skuse et al., 2004) provided evidence of significant difficulties in all three areas of the autistic triad.  
At the same time-point, the ADOS-G (Lord et al., 2000) also categorised her as having an ASC (Table 
1). 
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During test sessions at age 11, P4 was highly anxious and avoidant, and would not leave her 
mother.  At times during these sessions she would convey, mostly via her facial expression, a sense 
that her assessor was behaving somewhat foolishly, for example by adopting a scornful countenance 
when asked a question.  This tended to happen when P4 was asked to attempt activities that were 
challenging for her.  P4 demonstrated no obvious confabulation during her assessment, but her 
mother spontaneously reported a history of incidents when P4 had told stories that caused 
considerable alarm, and which on investigation turned out to be false.  For example, P4 had 
previously reported to teachers that she had been physically assaulted by her mother, but 
investigation had revealed that this was not the case.  In fact, it would be more accurate to say the 
reverse was true, as P4 was reported to have regularly hit her mother and to have threatened a 
sibling with a weapon on at least one occasion. 
 
Procedure 
Confabulation elicitation questionnaire. 
This consisted of 55 questions presented in a random order; 5 questions probed each of 
eleven domains.  These covered semantic and episodic information in various time frames, relating 
to the participant and his/her mother (see Table 2). There were two categories in which the 
appropriate response was “I don’t know”; participants were instructed that they should not guess if 
they did not know the answer, but should say “I don’t know”. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
After testing, the answers were verified with a parent, and the number of confabulations 
calculated.  Occasionally it was difficult to decide whether to attribute an incorrect answer to 
confabulation, to simple guessing or to genuinely incorrect knowledge. In these circumstances the 
parent’s impression was used as a guide. Small errors were allowed (e.g. +/- 2 years for “How old is 
your mum?”) 
Source monitoring tasks. 
Three  computer-based source monitoring tasks, using easily-recognisable images of familiar 
objects, were administered in the following order: (1) Temporal-context – first study phase (2) 
Reality monitoring – study and test phase (3) Temporal-context – second study and test phase (4) 
Task-context – study and test phase.  Reaction times and error rates were recorded. 
Temporal context task.  In the study phase, two sets of 12 images were presented, separated 
by an interval of approximately 10 minutes.  Participants were required to identify whether each 
item would normally be found inside a house within 10 seconds of the stimulus onset.  The test 
phase immediately followed the second set of study phase images and 36 images were presented in 
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a pseudorandomised order: the 24 images previously presented plus 12 novel images. Participants 
were required to identify whether they had seen the picture during the first or second study stage 
or whether it was new within 10 seconds of the stimulus onset. 
Reality monitoring task.  This task was based on Aleman, Bocker, Hijman, de Haan and Kahn 
(2003).  The study phase consisted of 32 trials in which a target word was presented, half 
accompanied by a picture of that word (perceive), the others by a question mark (imagine).  
Participants were encouraged to picture the target word in the ‘imagine’ condition.  These two types 
of stimuli were alternated sequentially and participants were asked to name the colour of the item 
they saw or imagined within 10 seconds of this stimulus onset.  The test phase was then 
immediately administered, consisting of 48 stimuli in a pseudorandomised order: the 32 words 
previously presented plus 16 novel words (see Figure 1).  Participants were required to identify 
whether each word had previously been perceived, imagined or was new within 10 seconds of the 
stimulus onset.  The number of errors made to previously perceived or imagined stimuli was 
recorded, as well as the number of imagined stimuli that were identified as having been perceived, 
and the number of novel items identified as having been previously perceived. 
Task context task.  The study phase consisted of 24 trials in which participants viewed an 
image.  Prior to this image, they were required to identify within 10 seconds either whether the item 
could make a noise (12 trials) or whether the item was larger than the testing laptop (12 trials), 
presented in a pseudo-randomised order.  The test phase immediately followed the study phase, 
consisting of 36 trials: the 24 images seen previously plus 12 new images. Participants were required 
to identify which question had been asked about each image, or whether the image was new within 
10 seconds. 
Episodic memory tests. In order to determine whether confabulation occurs in the context of 
a more widespread memory problem the ASC participants, visual recognition memory was tested 
using the Doors element and visual recall was tested using the Shapes element of the Doors and 
People test (Baddeley et al, 1994). The Doors and Shapes task scores were combined to give a total 
visual-memory score out of 60.  
In order to gain a control measure for general word learning effects in the source monitoring 
tasks, we used a word list learning procedure. First, List A (containing 12 words) was read to the 
participants. Immediately afterwards, the participants then recalled as many words as they could 
(the order was not important). Then they were read a second list (List B; also containing 12 words), 
and recalled as many words as they could. Next, participants were read a list of 40 words (the 12 
words from List A, the 12 words from List B, plus 16 new “distractors”). After each word, the 
participant were asked to say whether they thought the word had been on a list (they did not have 
to specify which), by answering yes or no. If they said they recognised one of the distractor words as 
having been on a list, this was classified that as an intrusion, or false-recognition. This procedure 
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yielded two measures: (a) recall: the number of words correctly recalled in stages (1) and (2), 
maximum of 24; (b) recognition: the number of words in Stage (3) correctly recognised as appearing 
on Lists A & B: max. of 24. These scores were combined to give a score out of 48, (listed as “recall 
and recognition” in Table 3); (c) the number of intrusions/false recognitions (marked out of 16). This 
is referred to as “New -> Old” in Table 3. 
 
Tests of executive function. 
Three measures of executive function were employed: The Hayling Test, the Brixton Test, and 
the Cognitive Estimates Test.  
The Hayling Sentence Completion Test (Burgess and Shallice, 1997) was previously modified 
for use with children by White et al. (2009); here we administered the task according to the manual 
(Burgess & Shallice, 1997) but with the child stimuli (White et al., 2009). In Part A, each sentence 
must be completed with an appropriate word, and in Part B with an unrelated word. Parts A and B 
therefore both require verbal generation but Part B also requires the inhibition of prepotent verbal 
responses.  Accuracy and response time were recorded for parts A and B separately. 
The Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test (Burgess and Shallice, 1997) is a measure of rule 
attainment and switching that has been shown to be sensitive to frontal lobe dysfunction, and to 
consequent bizarre responding (Burgess and Shallice, 1996a). In this test, the participant is 
presented with an array of ten dots, arranged in a 2x5 matrix, with each position numbered (1 is top 
left, 10 is bottom right). One of the dots is coloured blue and he/she is required to predict the 
position of the blue dot on the next trial and adjust his/her responses accordingly when the rule 
changes.  An example of a rule change is where the blue dots are following a sequence over several 
trials of increasing their position by +1, and then switches to a spatial sequence alternating between 
the top and bottom rows of the matrix instead. The total number of errors in predictions is 
recorded. 
The Cognitive Estimates Test (Shallice and Evans, 1978) was modified for use with children by 
Happé, Booth, Charlton and Hughes (2006) and this version was used here. The participant was 
asked a series of 10 questions that were likely to be novel (e.g. how tall are most lamp posts?) to 
which they were required to make a reasonable estimate. This is thought to tap response selection 
and monitoring, as well as inhibition. Responses were scored on a four-point scale (0-3) according to 
data from Happé et al., depending on age group (8-11, 11-13 and adult); 10 year olds were scored 
according to 8-11 data, those aged 11-15 according to 11-13 data, and those aged 16-17 according 





The performance of each confabulation participant was compared to the performances of 
both the TD and ASC control groups using the procedures for comparing single case scores with 
groups described by Crawford and colleagues (Crawford and Garthwaite, 2002; Crawford and 
Howell, 1998). The ASC and TD control groups were also compared to assess whether poor 
performance in the confabulation participants was specific to those participants or typical of 
individuals with autism more generally.  As the majority of data was not normally distributed in both 
control groups, non-parametric tests were used. For comparisons of individuals within a control 





Confabulation Elicitation Questionnaire 
Compared to both the TD controls and the ASC controls, P2 produced an abnormal number of 
confabulations on the Confabulation Elicitation Questionnaire (CEQ) (for comparison with TD 
controls, two-tailed probability = 0.00023, effect size = 4.769 95% CI 3.060 to 6.466; for comparison 
with ASC controls, two-tailed probability = 0.011, effect Size = 2.947 (95% CI 1.821 to 4.056)). For P1, 
the comparison with ASC controls just failed to reach significance (p = 0.084, 2-tailed), but the 
contrast between P1 and the TDs achieved significance (effect size 3.23, 95% CI 2.02-4.43, p<.01). P1 
produced 5 confabulations on the CEQ, which is the same as the worst TD participant (out of N= 18), 
and the two worst ASC controls (N = 17). P1 also produced 2 additional confabulations 
spontaneously, which are outlined below, but not included in the statistics for the Confabulation 
Elicitation Questionnaire (CEQ).  There was no significant difference between the TD and ASC control 
groups on this measure (U = 133.50, p = .525; see Table 3). 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
 
Here are examples of the participants’ confabulations during the confabulation elicitation 
procedure, presented verbatim (experimenter’s dialogue is presented in italics) (these 
confabulations as additional to those presented for the questionnaire in Table 3): 
 
Confabulating ASC participant 1 
 
 [laughter] 
Why are you laughing? 
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 I’m just laughing because my friend bought a computer from the Apple store, and it fell into 
 the Thames. He sat on a bench and put it on the rail, he tripped and his head caught the 
 computer, and it fell in. 
What is this friend called? 
 I can’t remember his name now. 
Are you still friendly with him? 
 Yes. 
Where was this? 
 The River Thames, near the Millennium Bridge. 
What happened then? 
 He went crazy with me. I lent him five quid to get it. He went crazy, he chased me all around 
 to Trafalgar Square and St James’s Park. But I ran into the tube station and got on the tube 
 and he chased me but then the door closed. He videoed it on his phone. 
What? 
 He videoed himself chasing me all the way through the centre of London. 
When did this happen? 
 Don’t know, I can’t remember. About two years ago.  
How can you get a computer for five quid? 
 I don’t know, he was just crazy. 
What about the money? 
 He still wants me to give it to him. I lent him the five quid and he paid me back just five days 
 later. 
 
Note: This appears to be spontaneous confabulation, which began in response to an enquiry as to 
why the subject was laughing. The subject’s mother was not aware of these events, and had not 
previously heard her son make reference to them. She reported that a friend had recently bought 
accessories from an Apple store, but the other details sounded unlikely to her. 
  
Similarly, the following spontaneous account began with the subject laughing to himself. According 




Why are you laughing? 
 Nothing, just a video I saw on YouTube. 
What was it? 
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An old friend, his chums made a slingshot and slung him all the way over the fence, they were meant 
to sling him into a swimming pool and they smashed him on to the neighbour’s Ferrari. 
Who were these people? 
 I don’t know, one of them was a friend of mine. 
 
Additionally, the following confabulations were not spontaneous, but were provoked by the 
confabulation elicitation procedure: 
 
Who was the first person you ever saw on television? 
 Jonathan Ross. My mum still hates me for that, she sent me upstairs because of the swearing 
 and I watched it on the computer.  
How old were you 
About eight. 
Did you not have a TV before that? 
 Before that, our electricity was always faulty, then it was fixed and we got a TV. 
 
 This answer contains confabulatory details. According to the participant’s mother, the family had 
only had a computer for a year, and their electricity was not faulty.  
 
Do you have any cousins? What are their names and ages? 
 No. 
 
The participant’s mother reported that he had many cousins, but that he confuses them with 
brothers and sisters. However, this was followed by another incorrect response: 
 
Does your mum have any other children? What are their names and ages? 
 No. 
 
 The participant’s mother reported that she did in fact have another child. 
 
Participant 2 
 When did you last travel by train? 
 One month ago, to London.  
 
The subject’s mother reported that she had not travelled by train for eight months. 
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 Do you have any cousins? What are their names and ages? 
 No. 
 
According to her mother, the subject has many cousins, whom she has met. 
  
What age did you start school? 
 One. 
 
This is an unusual response (which according to the mother cannot be explained by the child having 
gone to playgroup). Only one other participant (a TD control) gave a similar answer. 
 
Does your mum have any other children? What are their names and ages? 
 No 
 
The participant has siblings. 
  
Who is Bob the Builder? 
 A builder.  
 
This was the only response (out of all participants and controls) which did not identify Bob the 




What was the name of your first teacher at school? 
 Linda. 
 
This was incorrect: Linda had worked in the office. 
 
Source Monitoring Tasks (all statistical comparisons are 2-tailed) 
Reality monitoring task 
 P1 made significantly more errors when attempting to correctly identify previously 
perceived and imagined stimuli than either the TD or ASC control groups (reality monitoring errors; 
P1 vs TD effect size 3.73, 95% CI 2.35-5.10, p<.005; P1 vs ASC controls, two-tailed probability = 
0.034, effect size 2.39, 95% CI 1.43 to 3.323). This was mostly due to identifying imagined stimuli as 
having been perceived (I->P errors, P1 vs TD effect size 3.32, 95% CI 2.11-4.51, p<.005; P1 vs ASC 
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controls two-tailed probability = 0.051, effect size (Z-CC) 2.18 (95% CI 1.28 to 3.05). P1 was also 
much more likely than the TD controls to identify novel stimuli as having been previously perceived 
or imagined (i.e. false recognitions; P1 vs TD effect size 7.3 95% CI 4.84-9.81, p<.00001). However 
the difference between P1 and the ASC controls on this measure did not reach significance (p = 0.38, 
2-tailed). The two control groups did not differ significantly on any of these measures. 
Temporal context task 
 The confabulating participants performed at similar levels to TD controls, except for making 
false-recognitions where P1 and P4 performed poorly (two-tailed probability for both = 0.0096, 
effect size 3.0 (95% CI 1.891 to 4.093). These participants’ scores were not significantly different 
from the ASC controls, and there was no significant difference between the control groups for any of 
the temporal context measures. 
Task context task   
 P3 performed at similar levels to TD controls (results for P2 were not recorded due to 
technical failure). But P4 made a significantly larger number of context errors than the TD controls 
(two-tailed probability = 0.018, effect size 2.682 (95% CI 1.668 to 3.679)) or the ASC controls (two-
tailed probability = 0.049; effect size 2.182 (95% CI 1.285 to 3.059). P1 made a significant number of 
errors, relative to the TD group, where he identified stimuli he had already seen as being new (two-
tailed probability = 0.0085, effect size 3.059 (95% CI 1.932 to 4.169)). Mann-Whitney tests showed 
no significant difference between the two control groups for any result.  
Control tests for source monitoring tasks 
Performance of the confabulators on the visual memory and list-learning was generally 
comparable to TD controls. However P4 performed poorly at recall and recognition in the word-list 
learning test (comparison with TD controls: two-tailed probability = 0.013, effect size -2.84 (95% CI -
3.88 to -1.78)). However, this participant was not significantly poorer than the ASC controls, who 
were as a group significantly poorer than the TD controls (Mann-Whitney U = 64.50, p = .003). 
Indeed, four ASC controls performed as badly as or worse than P4. There was no significant 
difference between the control groups for Doors and Shapes, and although the ASC group were 
slightly weaker than the TD group in terms of intrusions/false-recognitions on the list learning task, 
this did not reach significance.  
Test of Executive Function 
As Table 3 shows, the difference between ASC and TD controls did not reach significance for 
Hayling Sentence Completion Test A (verbal initiation speed; Mann-Whitney U, p=0.062; range of 
ASC controls 5.5-21.1 secs; range of TDs 5.5-15.4). However, they did perform significantly more 
poorly than TD controls on Hayling B (verbal response suppression; range of ASC controls 7.1 to 
104.8 secs; range of TD controls 5.8-10.2) (U = 68.00, p = .008) and B-A (U = 79.00, p = .024). There 
was no significant difference between the two control groups on the remaining tests of executive 
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function tests however: Hayling B errors (U=113, p -0.195), Brixton (U = 146.50, p = .832), Cognitive 
Estimates score (U = 131.00, p = .483), Cognitive Estimates very extreme estimates (U = 138.50, p = 
.636).  
Within the confabulating ASC participants, P1’s performance on the Hayling B (response 
suppression) condition was significantly different from the TD controls (Hayling B two-tailed 
probability = 0.00006; effect size 5.57 (95% CI 3.597 to 7.535); B-A two-tailed probability = 0.0018, 
effect size 3.839 (95% CI 2.432 to 5.231)). This was also the case for P2 (Hayling B two-tailed 
probability = 0.0001, effect size 5.18 (95% CI 3.388 to 6.958), Hayling B-A two-tailed probability = 
0.0031, effect size 3.58 (95% CI 2.256 to 4.890)) and P4 (Hayling B time two-tailed probability = 
0.00009, effect size 5.25 (95% CI 3.437 to 7.052); Hayling B-A two-tailed probability = 0.0004, effect 
size 4.55 (95% CI 2.911 to 6.173)).  P2 also produced significantly more errors on the response 
suppression part of the Hayling Test than either the TD or ASC controls (Part B errors: comparison 
with TDs, two-tailed probability = 0.007, effect size 3.15 (95% CI 1.994 to 4.285); comparison with 
ASC controls p = 0.008, effect size 3.10 (96% CI 1.93 to 4.25). This performance was at a similar level 
to the worst performing control from both samples (N = 35), who was a TD control (who scored 14). 
There were additional noteworthy results from the confabulating participants. P2 performed 
poorly on the Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test (compared with TD controls: two-tailed probability = 
0.015, effect size 2.795 (95% CI 1.747 to 3.826)). This performance was not significantly poorer than 
the ASC controls, but was low within the range of them (at approximately the 11th percentile of the 
ASC controls). P4 also performed very poorly on the Brixton test, being  significantly impaired 
relative to both the TD controls and the ASC controls (compared with TD controls, two-tailed 
probability = 0.0001, effect size 5.103 (95% CI 3.336 to 6.857); compared with ASC controls, two-
tailed probability = 0.022, effect size 2.606 (95% CI 1.584 to 3.609). However, there was one outlier 
in the ASC control group (N= 17) who performed at a comparable level (34 errors).  
On the Cognitive Estimates test, P2 performed significantly less well than either the TD and 
ASC control groups in terms of both total score and very extreme estimates (total score: comparison 
with TD controls, two-tailed probability = 0.021, effect size -2.61 (95% CI -3.59 to -1.62); comparison 
with ASC controls, two-tailed probability = 0.0041, effect size -3.442(95% CI -4.71 to -2.16; Very 
extreme answers, compared with TD controls two-tailed probability = 0.015, effect size 2.77 (95% CI 
1.73 to 3.79); compared with ASC controls, two-tailed probability = 0.009, effect size 3.06 (1.90 to 
4.21)). None of the ASC or TD groups performed at a level comparable to this (worst performances 
in the TD group for total score was 10, and within the ASC control group 8, compared with P2’s score 
of 3 (lower scores are worse); for very extreme estimates, poorest TD performance was 5, and for 
the ASC controls 6, compared with P2’s 7 (higher score is worse)). As an aside, it might be worth 
noting that one of the two ASC controls who produced an unusual number of confabulations to the 
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Confabulation Elicitation Questionnaire was also the worst performing control participant (of either 





We have described four ASC participants who have shown confabulatory-type phenomena in 
everyday life. P1 produces florid spontaneous confabulations of the fantastic type. P2 is also a 
spontaneous confabulator, but the content of them is less fantastic. P3’s confabulations are more 
content specific and fixed, and revolve principally around one topic, and have a paramnesic quality. 
The relationship between confabulation and paramnesia is a complex one (see Burgess, Baxter, Rose 
and Alderman, 1996), but the distinction between the two is often made in relation to the breadth 
and fixedness of the belief held, often with justification for the false beliefs readily proffered. P4 is 
not a florid confabulator. The content of her confabulations is not grossly fantastic, is not fixed, nor 
are they content-specific. These four confabulators therefore show different confabulatory 
phenomena. However, confabulation is not a unitary phenomenon. Rather, it is a term that 
describes a family of memory errors, and similar forms can be found in the confabulation literature 
from neurological patients. 
Considering the psychometric test findings, three of the four participants have shown 
impairments on at least some of the tests given to them. The participant whose confabulatory 
symptoms seem most fixed and circumscribed, almost paramnesic in nature, was also the 
participant who passed all the experimental tests. The most obvious aspect of these children’s 
presentation however is that the confabulations are largely not occurring in the context of a marked 
amnesia. P4 was somewhat weak at the word list learning recall and recognition measure relative to 
the TD controls. But three of the ASC controls actually performed worse (and another performed at 
the same level), and P4 otherwise performed well at conventional memory tests. The three other 
confabulators were unimpaired on any of the verbal or visual episodic memory tasks. This 
presentation is somewhat different from that which typically occurs in neurological patients, where 
at least some degree of weakness on tests of episodic memory is the most common (although not 
inevitable) presentation. However, in other ways, the presentations of the confabulators here share 
features with what is sometimes seen in adult confabulators with acquired disorders. The most 
florid confabulator (P1) shows weakness on a range of source and context memory tests. P1 also 
failed one of the executive tasks administered (the Hayling Test), and showed provoked 
confabulations in response to the questions asked of him in the testing session, which is a type of 
memory phenomenon often referred to as “momentary confabulation” (Berlyne, 1972).  P1 
additionally produced two spontaneous episodic confabulations during the testing session. P2 also 
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showed momentary confabulation, and failed all three of the tests of executive function relative to 
the TD controls, and two of them relative to the ASC controls. P3 did not fail any of the cognitive 
tests and did not show momentary or provoked confabulation. P4 however showed a quite different 
pattern, being weak on the recall and recognition memory tasks, failing aspects of the context 
memory tests, and showing performance on the Brixton Test that was significantly weaker than 
either the TD or ASC controls. P4 also showed weak Hayling Test performance, as did P1, P2, and like 
the ASC control group as a whole. 
 It is worth noting that as a group, the non-confabulating ASC controls were significantly 
poorer than the TDs at the recall and recognition episodic memory test. They were not however 
significantly poorer at the reality monitoring and context memory tests. By contrast, two of the four 
confabulators failed at least one reality or context memory measure and only one failed the recall 
and recognition memory test. Of course, the groups in this study are too small to draw firm 
conclusions from these results. However, in future studies it might be worth considering whether 
the relationship between amnesia and confabulation may be even less strong in ASC participants 
than in neurological patients. We can at least say that it appears from these data that the presence 
of confabulation in ASC participants need not indicate, or result from, a marked amnesia. 
 It is prima facie striking, as mentioned above, that three of the confabulators (P1, P2 and P4) 
performed poorly on the timed submeasures of the Hayling task (Hayling time B and Hayling time B-
A). (One was also poor in terms of Hayling B errors.) However, performance was also poor on these 
timed measures in the ASC control group compared to the TD control group. This supports previous 
findings of executive dysfunction in autistic individuals, and specifically, the sensitivity of the Hayling 
Test in detecting them in this group (White, Burgess & Hill, 2009; Towgood et al, 2009). The 
Cognitive Estimates task only elicited remarkable results in P2. One process this task specifically 
examines is monitoring plausibility of responses. Accordingly, poor results might be most expected 
in those who produce bizarre confabulations. Since none of the subjects had a history of particularly 
bizarre confabulations, and no confabulations elicited by the confabulation battery were felt to be 
particularly bizarre, the significance of this pattern on the Cognitive Estimates test is perhaps 
unclear at this stage. 
 Indeed, this raises the issue of causality more generally. It is possible, as with many studies 
that have used similar experimental tasks in neurological patients, that the test results we have 
observed are unrelated to their confabulation. In other words, that they are epiphenomenal. This 
seems prima facie less plausible where the confabulating participants have performed more poorly 
than the age- and IQ-matched ASC controls. And in any case, there may be a less direct relation, but 
one which may be worthy of note nevertheless. For instance, the poor test performances may 
indicate a predisposing factor, or be an indicator for, or mediating variable for, a causal one. 
Furthermore, the relation between the diagnosis of autism and the presence of confabulation is no 
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less certain. More people with autism do not confabulate to an abnormal degree than do. And as far 
as we are aware, the prevalence of confabulation across many other populations is not well 
established. So it might be possible that confabulation is no more common in populations of people 
with a diagnosis of autism than in some others. It is not possible on the present evidence to speak to 
these complex issues. Overall, the situation of linking a particular symptom to a particular cause is far 
less easy than for neurological patients with acquired deficits, where they show a behaviour which 
they did not pre-morbidly. However, the statistical plausibility of such causal matters might perhaps 
be investigated in much larger ASC (and other developmental conditions) samples, as has been 
conducted for many other behaviours noticed in people with ASC. However, the variation in 
presentations found between the confabulating participants argues against a single underlying 
mechanism of all confabulation in people who show ASC characteristics. In this way, the variety of 
confabulatory phenomena mirrors the wide variety in patterns of neuropsychological abilities that 
are found in ASC (Towgood et al, 2009). 
There are of course several limitations to this current multiple-case study, some of which 
suggest ways forward for future research. Although the confabulators and the ASC control group 
were well-matched by age, ideally they would also have been perfectly matched by sex, IQ (perhaps) 
and ADOS score.  Another limitation is the possible inclusion of undetected confabulators in the 
comparison groups. Given that every person shows at least some degree of confabulation in 
everyday life (Burgess & Shallice, 1996b), because our memory systems are highly fallible, it is not 
clear what exclusion and inclusion criteria should be used.  So we made the simplifying assumption 
that participants were assumed not to show unusual degrees of confabulation unless there were 
specific reports of this behaviour. However, some formal measure on which selection could be made 
would have been desirable. It would also have been preferable for the experimenter to have been 
blind as to group membership, but this was not practically possible for this study. Another possibility 
for future experimentation would be to present the confabulation elicitation procedure more than 
once. This might permit examination of the stability of confabulations, and may perhaps elicit 
differences between neurological and autistic confabulation, since the latter seems not to occur 
with the same frequency of association with amnesia.  
There are some experimental design considerations that are specific to testing an ASC 
population, or at least that are of more frequent concern than with e.g. neurological patients, and 
these need to be considered in future experimental designs. For instance, in the reality-monitoring 
task participants entered responses using computer keys labelled with a pair of eyes for “seen” and 
a thought-bubble for “imagined”. Testing an ASC population raises the possibility that poor 
performance might be secondary to difficulty with understanding the representation of thoughts 
using bubbles, pursuant to a deficit in mentalising (as predicted by Wellman et al, 1996). A counter-
argument is that it has been demonstrated that at least some autistic children can understand 
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thought-bubbles as a way of representing thoughts (Parsons and Mitchell, 1999). In order to try to 
guard against such a possible artefact, in this experiment participants were allowed to decide for 
themselves which button represented thought. This ensured that even if a subject did not 
appreciate the meaning of thought-bubbles, they could respond appropriately by a process of 
elimination (i.e. since they had two options to choose from). They also practised responding to 
example questions. This kind of consideration may be one way in which straightforward use of 
procedures taken from the neurological literature might yield unexpected results unless the special 
demands of testing this population are considered. Another possible source of error in the test 
phase was the use of words as cues with no associated picture. Considering the typically delayed 
language development in ASC, different results may have been elicited if the words were presented 
verbally, and we will consider this as an addition in future investigations. 
 A further consideration is whether the executive function deficits here may not be due to 
executive dysfunction per se, but rather due to deficits in social cognition. It has been suggested that 
individuals with autism may struggle with any task that requires an implicit understanding of the 
experimenter’s expectations for the task, due to their difficulties representing another’s mental 
perspective (White, 2013). For instance, there is evidence of improved performance in people with 
ASC when they use a computer as opposed to a human examiner on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
(Ozonoff et al 1995), and tower tasks (Kenworthy, Yerys, Guterman and Wallace, 2008). It would 
have been preferable to administer the tasks through a computer. For this reason, future 
experimentation might consider computerised presentation. However, the inclusion of an ASC 
comparison group for the confabulators goes some way to address this issue. A further consideration 
is whether the pattern of results would have been different with other tasks of executive function. It 
has been suggested that people with ASC may perform well on many tests of executive function, 
apart from the less structured, “open-ended tests” (Kenworthy et al, 2008; White et al, 2009). The 
Hayling, Brixton, and Cognitive Estimates tests were all chosen for inclusion in this study because all 
can provide a measure of “bizarre” responding, and there is a clear a priori theoretical relationship 
with fantastic confabulation. However, if fantastic confabulation is not generally a feature of ASC 
confabulatory phenomena, then alternative tests of executive function might be logical choices. 
 A key question for any consideration of confabulation concerns the motivation or cause for 
the confabulations. Although the confabulatory phenomena, and the patterns of psychometric test 
performances presented here share features with confabulators shown by people with acquired 
neurological conditions, it would be premature to draw too strong a conclusion about parallels 
between the two populations. Neurological patient confabulators are unaware that they are 
confabulating, and there is no intent to deceive the listener. It is possible that in contrast, the autistic 
confabulators are fully aware that they are giving invented responses and accounts (of course, in this 
case we would not formally classify these as confabulations). Perhaps these children do not 
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appreciate that such behaviour is socially unacceptable, or perhaps they do not even perceive that 
their audience is not being deceived. Pretence and deception is so prevalent in normal social 
relations, and in entertainment (films, stories etc), that those who struggle with social convention, 
and may have limited ability to intuit about what other people are thinking, may understand 
differently the significance of producing accounts that are inaccurate. We also cannot rule out the 
possibility that at least some of these confabulations were motivated by gain in some way, emotional 
or otherwise, knowingly or otherwise. The issue of “motivated confabulation” (e.g. Fotopoulou, 
Conway and Solms, 2007) within neurological patients is an interesting topic, and one which is the 
subject of much current debate. It might be useful to consider this debate within the current 
population also. Certainly, it is clear that being an unreliable witness is not a universal ASC 
characteristic (McCrory, Henry and Happé, 2007). But perhaps there is a small subsection of the ASC 
population for whom this is a more prevalent feature.  Clearly, more research is needed into the 
forms, the causes, and the neuroscientific features of this interesting symptom, and this study seems 
to suggest that applying the methods that have historically been so instructive in the investigation of 
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P1 P2 P3 P4 
N (M:F) 18 (11:7) 17 (13:4) M F F F 
Age (years) 12.8 (1.8) 13.8 (1.7) 14 11 17 11 
VIQa - 93 (15) 96 - 99 77 
PIQa - 94 (11) 88 73 117 98 
3DIb - soc - 14.7 (4.6) 14.9 - 11.4 21.7 
 - comm - 14.3 (4.7) 16.2 - 15.2 21.2 
 - rep beh - 5.4 (2.9) 10 - 1.3 4.8 
ADOSc  social - 5.4 (3.2) 7 - - 6 
communication - 2.7 (1.8) 6 - - 4 
Diagnosis - 5 autism 
8 AS 
4 ASC 
autism autism AS ASC 
a VIQ = Verbal Intelligence Quotient; PIQ = Performance Intelligence Quotient. IQ data were 
unavailable for three ASC controls. 
b The Developmental, Dimensional and Diagnostic Interview (3DI; Skuse et al, 2004). 3DI data was 
unavailable for two ASC controls. 







Table 2 Confabulation Elicitation Questionnaire: Example questions 
 
  
Domain Example question 
Current personal semantic  Do you have any cousins? What are their names?  
Remote personal semantic Who was your first teacher at school? 
Current personal episodic Tell me about your most recent holiday. 
Remote personal episodic Tell me about a trip to the zoo you have been on. 
Future personal episodic Where are you going to eat lunch tomorrow? 
Current other semantic Does your mum have any brothers or sisters? 
Remote other semantic Did your mum go to university? 
Current general semantic Who is the current Prime Minister? 
Remote general semantic Who was Princess Diana? 
Don’t know semantic Which country did the longest skateboard journey finish in? 
Don’t know episodic What was number one in the charts on your fifth birthday? 
 34 
Table 3 Results; means (and standard deviations) with statistically significant results in bold. 
 TD controls ASC controls P1 P2 P3 P4 
Confabulation Elicitation 
Questionnaire (N of confabs) 
0.8 (1.3) 1.4 (1.9) 5t,& 7t,a 0 1 
Reality monitoring 
- errors1 
- I->P errors2 
- I/P->N errors3 

































- ?->N errors6 



























- ?->N errors9 


























- recall & recognition11 
- new->old12 


























- time A 
- time B  
- time B-A  































Brixton Test14 13.1 (3.9) 14.5 (7.1) 7 24t 16 33t,a 
Cognitive estimates15 
- total£ 



















t Comparison with the TD control group significant at p<.05 (or stricter criteria, see text). Comparison 
between single cases and control groups were conducted using the statistical procedures for single 
case designs developed by Crawford and colleagues (Crawford, Garthwaite and Porter, 2010; 
Crawford and Garthwaite, 2002; Crawford and Howell, 1998). Comparisons between ASC and TD 
control groups were conducted using Mann-Whitney U test. 
a Comparison with the ASC control group significant at p<.05 (or stricter criteria, see text). 
- Data missing. 
$ Higher scores indicate worse performance. 
£ Lower scores indicate poorer performance. 
& In addition to the 5 confabulations to the questions listed here, P1 additionally produced two 
spontaneous confabulations during completion of this task.  
1 Total errors where the participant either mistook a perceived stimulus for an imagined one, or vice-
versa. 
2 Errors where the participant specifically mistook an imagined stimulus as one they had perceived. 
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3 Errors where the participant mistook an earlier item (either imagined or perceived) as a new one. 
4 Errors where the participant identified a new item as one they had imagined or perceived before. 
5 Errors where the participant either thought an item from the first list came from the second or vice-
versa. 
6 Where the participant thought that a previously presented item was new. 
7 Where the participant thought that a new item had been presented previously. 
8 Where the participant mistook the question that they had been asked about the image. 
9 Where the participant thought that a previously presented item was new. 
10 Where the participant thought that a new item had been presented previously. 
11 Word list learning – combined recall and recognition. 
12 Mistaking one of the (new) foils for an item previously presented.  
13 Visual recognition and recall subtests from the Door and People Test (Baddeley et al, 1994). 
14 Burgess and Shallice (1997). 





Captions to Figures 
 
Figure 1: The reality monitoring paradigm. 
 
